

University of Rochester Political Science

Psc 584
Game Theory

Mark Fey and Scott Tyson
Fall 2023

Syllabus

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This course is taught by Mark Fey and Scott Tyson. If you have any questions, please contact them at the above email addresses.

Topic 0 The Basic of Bargaining

- Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 4.4
- Gibbons, sec. 2.1.D
- Ariel Rubinstein, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," *Econometrica* 50:1 (1982), 97{110 (JSTOR)
- John Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica* 18:21 (1950), 155{162 (JSTOR)

Topic 1 Bayesian Games and Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium

- Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 6
- Gibbons, ch. 3
- John C. Harsanyi, "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I-III," *Management Science* 14 (1967), 159{182, 320{334, 486{502 (JSTOR)
- John C. Harsanyi, "Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points," *International Journal of Game Theory* 2 (1973), 1-23
- Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal, "Private incentives in social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism," *Journal of Public Economics* 35 (1988) 309{332 (link)

Topic 2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium

- Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 8
- Gibbons, sec. 4.1
- Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium,"

