University of Rochester Political Science

Psc

Prof. Mark Fey

Week 1 Introductory Thoughts and Review

Week 2 Policy-Motivated Candidates and Probabilistic Voting

• Calvert (1985); Duggan and Fey (2005); Hinich (1977); Banks and Duggan (2005)

Week 3 Candidate Quality

• Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000); Groseclose (2001); Aragones and Palfrey (2002); Aragones and Xefteris (2012)

Week 4 Voter Turnout Models

• Ledyard (1984); Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983); Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985); Kalandrakis (2009)

Week 5 Candidate Entry

• Palfrey (1984); Greenberg and Shepsle (1987); Weber (1992); Osborne (1993)

Week 6 Citizen Candidates and Voting for Policies

• Feddersen (1992);

 Austen-Smith and Banks (1996); Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996); Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997); Fey and Kim (2002)

Week 11 Pandering

• Canes-Wrone et al. (2001); Ashworth and Shotts (2010); Kartik et al. (2015)

Week 12 Cheap Talk in Elections

 Warneryd (1994); Harrington Jr (1992); Heidhues and Lagerlef (2003); Kartik and Van Weelden (2019)

Week 13 Information Acquisition

• Martinelli (2006); Gerardi and Yariv (2008); Tyson (2016)

Week 14 Aggregate Uncertainty

• Myatt (2007); Acharya and Meirowitz (2017); Myatt 2012

Week 15 Populism

• Acemoglu et al. (2013); Eguia and Giovannoni (2019); Buisseret and Van Weelden (2020)

Week 16 Polarization and Information

• Grosser and Palfrey (2014); Di Lonardo (2017); Aragones and Xefteris (2017)

References

- Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin 2013. \A political theory of populism," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128, 771{805.
- Acharya, Avidit and Adam Meirowitz 2017. \Sincere voting in large elections," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 101, 121{131.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen and James M Snyder 2000. Valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models," *Public Choice*, 103, 327{336.
- Aragones, Enriqueta and Thomas R. Palfrey 2002. \Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 103, 131{161. (link).
- Aragones, Enriqueta and Dimitrios Xefteris 2012. \Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 75, 464{480.
- Aragones, Enriqueta and Dimitrios Xefteris 2017. \Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism," *International Economic Review*, 58, 439{471.
- Ashworth, Scott and Kenneth W Shotts 2010. \Does informative media commentary reduce politicians' incentives to pander?," *Journal of Public Economics*, 94, 838{847.
- Austen-Smith, David and Je rey S. Banks 1996. \Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," *American Political Science Review*, 90, 34{45. (JSTOR).
- Banks, Je rey S. and John Duggan 2005. \Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of O ce-motivated Candidates." In Austen-Smith, David and John Duggan, eds., *Social Choice and Strategic Decisions*, pages 15{56. Berlin: Springer. (link).
- Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate 1997. \An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112, 85{114. (JSTOR).

- Buisseret, Peter and Richard Van Weelden 2020. \Crashing the party? Elites, outsiders, and elections," *American Journal of Political Science*, 64, 356{370.
- Calvert, Randall L. 1985. \Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence,"

 American Journal of Political Science, 29, 69(95. (JSTOR).
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts 2001. \Leadership and pandering: A theory of executive policymaking," American Journal of Political Science, pages 532{550.
- Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli 2004. \Bad politicians," *Journal of public economics*, 88, 759{782.
- Cox, Gary W. 1987. \Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions," *American Journal of Political Science*, 31, 82{108. (JSTOR).
- Cox, Gary W. 1990. \Centripital and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," *American Journal of Political Science*, 34, 903{935. (JSTOR).
- Cox, Gary W. 1994. \Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote," *American Political Science Review*, 88, 608{621. (JSTOR).
- Dellis, Arnaud 2011. \The Two-Party System under Alternative Voting Procedures.
- Di Lonardo, Livio 2017. \Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 29, 327{350.
- Duggan, John and Mark Fey 2005. \Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 51, 490{522. (link).
- Eguia, Jon X and Francesco Giovannoni 2019. \Tactical extremism," American political science review, 113, 282{286.
- Feddersen, Timothy J. 1992. \A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout," *American Journal of Political Science*, 36, 938{962. (JSTOR).

- Kalandrakis, Tasos 2009. \Robust rational turnout," *Economic Theory*, 41, 317{343.
- Kartik, Navin, Francesco Squintani, and Katrin Tinn 2015. \Information revelation and pandering in elections.
- Kartik, Navin and Richard Van Weelden 2019. \Informative cheap talk in elections," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86, 755 {784.
- Ledyard, John O 1984. \The pure theory of large two-candidate elections," *Public Choice*, 44, 7{41.
- Martinelli, Cesar 2006. \Would rational voters acquire costly information?," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 129, 225{251.
- Mattozzi, Andrea and Antonio Merlo 2008. \Political careers or career politicians?," *Journal of Public Economics*, 92, 597 (608.
- Messner, Matthias and Mattias K Polborn 2004. \Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2423{2445.
- Morelli, Massimo 2004. \Party formation and policy outcomes under di erent electoral systems," *Review of Economic Studies*, 71, 829{853.
- Myatt, David P 2007. \On the theory of strategic voting," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 74, 255{281.
- Myerson, Roger B. and Robert J. Weber 1993. \A Theory of Voting Equilibria," *American Political Science Review*, 87, 102{114. (JSTOR).
- Osborne, Martin J. 1993. \Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 5, 133{151. (link).
- Osborne, Martin J. and Al Slivinski 1996. \A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111, 65{96. (JSTOR).
- Palfrey, Thomas R. 1984. \Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," *Review of Economic Studies*, 51, 139{156. (JSTOR).
- Palfrey, Thomas R. 1989. \A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law." In

Prof. Mark Fey

8

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal 1983. \A Strategic Calculus of Voting," *Public Choice*, 41, 7{53.

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal 1985. \Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," *American Political Science Review*, 79, 62{78.