

University of Rochester Political Science


PSC 584
Game Theory

Prof. Mark Fey
Fall 2022

Syllabus

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This course is designed to teach graduate students in political science the



- Michael Spence, "Job Market Signaling," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87 (1973), 355-374 (JSTOR)
- In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps, "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102 (1987), 179-222 (JSTOR)
- Jeffrey S. Banks and Joel Sobel, "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," *Econometrica* 55 (1987), 647-661 (JSTOR)
- David Epstein and Peter Zemski, "Money Talks: Detering Quality Challenges in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science*

