

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Pol. Sci. 513
Professor Rothenberg

Spring 2022

INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

Purpose: This course principally introduces students to the political science and political economy literatures on interest groups. This includes developing an understanding of the makeup of the group system, contribution decision that help support groups, the internal politics of organizations, the strategies that groups employ and the role that they play with respect to political institutions. As the study of organized groups cuts across many subdisciplines in political science and political economy, and includes certain elements of finance and even accounting, this course might have a wide appeal.

Requirements: Course requirements include research presentations and a longer final paper—either original research, a detailed literature review, or a research proposal (roughly 15 pages will suffice).

Office Hours. I am located in Room 108 at Harkness (Department of Political Science/Wallis Institute of Political Economy). You can come by any time and I will see you barring extenuating circumstances. My phone number is x3-4903 and my e-mail is lawrence.rothenberg@rochester.edu. In this odd time in which we live, zoom meetings are available—just send an email request.

Availability of Readings. Articles will be made available through Dropbox. There are several standard books that I am happy to reference—as well as extended reading readings on virtually any topic—if students would like. Additionally, if you would like a broader appreciation of what interest group scholars in Political Science do, you might consult surveying the journal *Interest Groups & Advocacy*. Also, please note that data for many of the empirical papers are data available through Dataverse.

Grading. Grading will reflect your class participation and your final paper (weighted approximately 1/2, 1/2).

Week I: Introduction/Overview. (Jan. 12th)

Overview Pieces on Interest Groups (**not required reading**):

Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech. 2012. "Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group Research," *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 79-99.

John M. de Figueiredo and Brian Kelleher Richter. 2014. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 163-185.

Martin Gregor. 2017. "Lobbying Mechanisms," in *State, Institutions, and Democracy*, Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero eds., 17-52.

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying." *Annual Review of Economics* 12: 391-413.

Week II: Macro-Perspectives (Jan. 19th).

Herschel F. Thomas and Timothy M. LaPira. 2017. "How Many Lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow Lobbying and the Gray Market for Policy Advocacy," *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 6 (3): 199-214.

Lee Drutman, Matt Grossmann, and Tim LaPira. 2019. "The Interest Group Top Tier: More Groups, Concentrated Clout," in *Can American Govern*

Week III. Micro-Foundations (Jan. 26th).

Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray. 2001. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox,"
American Political Science Review 95 (3): 663-672.

Alexander V. Hirsch. 2016. "Experimentation and Persuasion in Political Organizations,"
American Political Science Review 110 (1): 68-84.

Zhao Li. 2018. "How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from
Access-Seeking PACs," *American Political Science Review* 112 (4): 792-808.

Week IV. Lobbying: Who Lobbies—Part I (Feb. 2nd).

William R. Kerr, William F. Lincoln, and Prachi Mishra. 2014. “The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying,” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6 (4): 343-379.

In Song Kim. 2017. “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization,” *American Political Science Review* 111 (1): 1-20.

Alexander Fourinaies, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. “How do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees,” *American Journal of Political Science* 62(1): 132-147.

In Song Kim, and Dmitriy Kunisky. 2021. “Mapping Political Communities: A Statistical Analysis of Lobbying Networks in Legislative Politics.” *Political Analysis* 29 (3), 317-336.

Bo Cowgill, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti. 2021. Political Power and Market Power.

Notes:

On measures of group ideology, see:

Adam Bonica. 2013. “Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (2): 294-311. Data:

Week VII: Impacts of Lobbying (Feb. 23rd

Weeks XI-XII. Lobbying the Courts and Bureaucracy. (March. 30th,

Week XIII. Private Politics (Apr. 20th).

David P. Baron. 2012. "The Industrial Organization of Private Politics," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7 (2): 135-174.

Gregory Egorov, and Bård Harstad. 2017

Some Data Sources

American data:

LobbyView: <https://www.lobbyview.org/>

Adam Bonica's Ideal Point Data: <https://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/data.html>

Maplight Data: www.maplight.org

Open Secrets: <https://www.opensecrets.org/>

Some European data:

<http://www.intereuro.eu/public/data>

<https://www.cigsurvey.eu/>

See, also, the 2020 special issue of *Interest Groups & Advocacy* on data sources:

<https://browzine.com/libraries/107/journals/10580/issues/356254176>