The first presentation could be one of three types as follows:

Presentation of a particular **comparative quantitative data set**, as suggested in parenthesis each week. The student is responsible for examining the appropriate website and related matdfile(\$7378646)(0)(2);20(T(peff4q6))9(0)090992)) & 21(2)74(233(Wpf))B(F(Ff)-9(2)T(fi))00(s))33(6,8);86(8);9(3)n193)

Cox, Gary. Making Votes Count. Cambridge, 1997.
Duch and Stevenson. The Economic Voter. Cambridge. 2008.
Helmke, Gretchen. Institutions on the Edge. Cambridge 2016.
Laver & Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge 1996.
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players. Cambridge 2002.

Required assigned chapters in other books will be available through Blackboard or distributed by email.

Sept. 1 Democratic Concepts

Dahl, Robert. 1989. <u>Democracy & Its Critics</u>, Yale, chs. 6-8, 15.
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation," *APSR* 97:515-528.
Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundation of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review* 91 (2): 245-63.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Aristotle. <u>Politics</u>. Books IV and VI <u>http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three</u> Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* April.

Sept. 8 Parties, Party Systems as Democratic Linkages

Aldrich, John. 1995. <u>Why Parties</u>?, Ch 1-2.
Powell, G. Bingham. 2019. <u>Ideological Representation: Achieved and Astray</u>, Cambridge. Ch. 1.
*Achen, Christopher & Larry Bartels. 2016. <u>Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not</u> <u>Produce Responsive Government.</u> Princeton: Ch. 1, 2.
Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, et al., 2013. Brokers, Voters and Clientelism, Chs. 1, 3, 7, 8.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Kitschelt, Herbert & Daniel Kselman, 2013. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46: 1453-1484. Kraymon & Posner 2013. "Who Benefits..." *Perspectives on Politics*.

Sept. 15 Shaping Party Systems 1: Electoral Rules & Cleavages

* Cox, Gary. <u>Making Votes Count</u>. 1997, Esp. Ch 1-4,7-8,10-12,15 (A two-part discussion.)
Fujiwara. 2011. "A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law,
"Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6: 197-233.
Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. <u>Commerce & Coalitions</u>, Ch. 1

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Lijphart <u>et al. 1994.</u> <u>Electoral Systems</u>.... Riker, William. 1982. "Two-Party Systems & Duverger's Law" *APSR*. Moser & Scheiner, 2012. Electoral Systems Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot." *APSR 102* : 19-31.

Oct 6 Policymaking Institutions 1: Parliamentary Government Formation (Comparative Manifesto Project)

*Laver, Michel & Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. <u>Making & Breaking Governments</u>, Chapters 4,5,7-9 Baron "Spatial Bargaining Theory" *APSR* March 1991. Martin, Lanny & Randolph Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation," *AJPS*,

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Budge, Ian, et al. 2001. <u>Mapping Policy Preferences.</u> Laver & Schofield, <u>Multiparty Government</u>, 1990. Martin & Stevenson, Effect of Incumbency, *APSR* 2010.

Volden, Craig, and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2004. "The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 521-37.

Warwick PV, Druckman JN. 2006. "The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship," EJPR, 45(4): 635-65.

Oct 13 Policymaking Institutions 2: Government survival and termination

Lupia and Strom (1995). "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, no. 3: 648-669.

Schleiter, P. and E. Morgan-Jones. 2009. "Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets," *American Political Science Review*, 103(3): 496-512. Smith A. 2003. "Election Timing In Majoritarian Parliaments," *British Journal of Political Science*, 33(3): 397-418.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Diermeier & Stevenson, "Cab terminations" APSR 3 2000.

Warwick P. 1992. "Economic-Trends and Government Survival In West European Parliamentary Democracies," *American Political Science Review*, 86(4): 875-887. Kayser M. 2004. "Who surfs who manipulates" *APSR*.

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Oct 20 Policymaking Institutions 3: Legislative Institutions, Coalitions

Martin, Lanny & Georg Vanberg, <u>Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative</u> <u>Institutions in Multiparty Governance</u>. Oxford University Press 2011. Ch. xxx

Fortunato, David. 2019. "Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments" *American Political Science Review* 113: 242-247.

Huber, John D. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 90 (2): 269-282.

Daniel Diermeier and Timothy Feddersen, 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure," *American Political Science Review*, 92: 611- 621.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 81, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 85-104

Oct 27 Policymaking Institutions 4: Divided Power, Presidentalism, & Federalism

*Tsebelis, Veto Players Princeton 2002., esp. ch1-4, 6-9

* Helmke, Institutions on the Edge, ch

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Barnya R. Weingsaftn, "Self-Enforcing Federalism," in Joannal of y@y Law, Economics, and Organization, 2005 21:103-135.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Erik Wibbels, "Madison in Baghdad?: Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 9: 165-188.
Barry R. Weingast, "The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective," in Claude Menard and Mary M. Shirley (eds.) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.
Shugart & Carey Presidents and Assemblies Ch.
Chibber & Kollman Formation of National Party Systems, ch.
Elkins and Ginsberg. 2009. The Endurance of National Constitutions. Cambridge.

Nov. 3: Policy making Institutions 5: Courts & Bureaucracy

Hanssen Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence? <u>American Economic</u> <u>Review</u>

*Tsebelis, <u>Veto Players</u> Princeton 2002., esp. chs. 6, 10.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

Ramseyer, J. 1994. "The Puzzling (In)dependence of courts -

Nichter