Topic 0 The Basic of Bargaining

> Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 4.4
>
> Gibbons, sec. 2.1.D
>
> Ariel Rubinstein, \Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
> *Econometrica* 50:1 (1982), 97{110 (JSTOR)
>
> John Nash, \The Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica* 18:21 (1950),
> 155{162 (JSTOR)

Topic 1 Bayesian Games and Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium

> Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 6
>
> Gibbons, ch. 3
>
> John C. Harsanyi, \Games with Incomplete Information Played by
> `Bayesian' Players, I-III," *Management Science* 14 (1967), 159{182,
> 320{334, 486{502 (JSTOR)
>
> John C. Harsanyi, \Games with randomly disturbed payo s: a new
> rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points," *International Journal
> of Game Theory* 2 (1973), 1-23
>
> Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal, \Private incentives in
> social dilemmas : The e ects of incomplete information and altruism,"
> *Journal of Public Economics* 35 (1988) 309{332 (link)

Topic 2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium

> Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 8
>
> Gibbons, sec. 4.1
>
> Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, \Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and
> sequential equilibrium," *Journal of Economic Theory* 53 (1991),
> 236{260

Topic 3 Signaling Games

> Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 11.2
>
> Gibbons, sec. 7.1

Michael Spence, \Job Market Signaling," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87 (1973), 355{374 (JSTOR)

In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps, \Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102 (1987), 179{222 (JSTOR)

Je rey S. Banks and Joel Sobel, \Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," *Econometrica* 55 (1987), 647{661 (JSTOR)

David Epstein and Peter Zemski, \Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995), 295{308 (JSTOR)

Topic 4 Preplay Communication and Cheap Talk

Gibbons, sec. 4.3.A

Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, \Cheap Talk," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10 (1996), 103{118 (JSTOR)

Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel, \Strategic Information Transmission," *Econometrica* 50 (1982), 1431{1451 (JSTOR)

Topic 5 Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games

Dominance

Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 11.2

Gibbons, sec. 1.1.B

Nash Equilibrium

Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 1.2{1.3

Gibbons, sec. 1.1.C & 1.3

John Nash, \Non-Cooperative Games," *Annals of Mathematics* 54 (1951), 286{295 (JSTOR)

Matthew O. Jackson, Leo K. Simon, Jeroen M. Swinkels, and William R. Zame, \Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information," *Econometrica* 70 (2002), 1711{1740 (JSTOR)

R. Selten, \Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games," *International Journal of Game Theory* 4 (1975), 25{55

Topic 6 Advanced Topics in Extensive Form Games

 Strategies

>   Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 3.1{3.4
>   Gibbons, sec. 2.1

 Subgame Perfection

>   Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 3.5{3.6
>   Gibbons, sec. 2.2{2.4

Topic 7 More Bargaining

>   Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 4.4

Topic 8 Repeated Games

>   Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 5

>   Gibbons, sec. 2.3

>   Dilip Abreu, Prajit K. Dutta, and Lones Smith, \The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," *Econometrica* 62 (1994), 939{948 (JSTOR)

Topic 9 Markov Perfect Equilibrium

>   Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 13

Topic 10 Common Knowledge

>   Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 14