

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Pol. Sci. 513
Professor Rothenberg

Spring 2020

INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

Purpose: This course principally introduces students to the political science and political economy literatures on interest groups. This includes developing an understanding of the makeup of the group system, contribution decision that help support groups, the internal politics of organizations, the strategies that groups employ and the role that they play with respect to political institutions. As the study of organized groups cuts across many subdisciplines in political science and political economy, and includes certain elements of finance and even accounting, this course might have a wide appeal.

Requirements: Course requirements include research presentations and a longer final paper either original research, a detailed literature review, or a research proposal (roughly 15 pages will suffice).

Week I: Introduction/Overview. (Jan. 27th)

Overview Pieces on Interest Groups (**not required reading**):

Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech.
Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group
Research *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (3): 79-99.

John M. de Figueiredo
Annual Review of Political Science 17: 163-185.

State, Institutions, and Democracy, Norman
Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero eds., 17-52.

paper. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w26287>

Week II: Macro-Perspectives (Feb. 3rd).

Interest Groups & Advocacy 5 (1): 25-56.

Herschel F. Thomas and Timothy M. LaPira

Advocacy 6 (3): 199-214.

Interest Groups &

Thomas T. Holyok Interest Group and Lobbying Research in a Higher Level Context:
Two Tests of Integrating Multiple Levels of Analysis *American Politics Research* 45
(5): 887-902.

Lee Drutman, Matt Grossmann, and Tim LaPira. 2019
in *Can American Govern Itself?*, Frances E. Lee and Nolan
McCarty, eds.

James Strickland

Recommended:

Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. LaPira, and Nicholas A. Semanko. 2005.
Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for
Advocacy *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (1): 19-30.

Journal of Politics 72 (3): 659-671.

Note: Please be familiar with the basic logic of collective action at least to the level of Olson (1965); if not, review Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action*, Chs. 1, 2, and 6. There are also a variety of other works in this tradition as well to which I would be happy to provide citations. Here are three somewhat recent reviews of collective action theory:

Annual Review of Political Science 16: 259-283.

Logic of Collective Action *Public Choice* 162 (3-4):
243-262.

Public Choice 164 (3-4): 195-216.

Recommended:

Jack Walker. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*. Chapter 5.

Robert C. Lowry toward Citizen Groups and Think Tanks: Who
Journal of Politics 61 (3): 758-776.

Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi. *Journal of*
Public Economic Theory 10 (5): 785-799.

Week IV. Lobbying: Who Lobbies Part I (Feb. 17th).

Wendy Hansen, Neil J. Mitchell, and Jeffrey M. Drope

American Journal of Political Science 49 (1): 150-167.

International Economics 75 (2): 329-348.

Journal of

William R.

The Dynamics of Firm

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6 (4): 343-379. Data:

<https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/114883/version/V1/view;jsessionid=6777F4AD71A5E04664FECFB9B4B4989D>

American Political Science Review 111 (1): 1-20. See LobbyView page:

<https://www.lobbyview.org/#/>.

Alexander Fourinaies, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018 How do Interest Groups Seek Access to

American Journal of Political Science 62(1): 132-147. Data:

<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/PGCVDP>

In Song Kim, and Dmitriy Kunisky. 2020

Political Analysis (forthcoming).

See LobbyView page: <https://www.lobbyview.org/#/>.

Note: On measures of group ideology, see:

American Journal of

Political Science 57 (2): 294-311. Data:

<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/HUZNE2>

Jesse M. Crosson

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jesse_Crosson2/publication/324040699_Estimating_Interest_Group_Ideal_Points_with_Public_Position-Taking_on_Bills_in_Congress/links/5ca791bb299bf118c4b58141/Estimating-Interest-Group-Ideal-Points-with-Public-Position-Taking-on-Bills-in-Congress.pdf

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kevin_Esterling/publication/306464174_Placing_Lobbyists_and_Legislators_in_Common_Ideological_Space/links/57be394a08aed246b0f72fea/Placing-Lobbyists-and-Legislators-in-Common-Ideological-Space.pdf

For a broad modeling exercise, see:

Journal of Theoretical Politics 31 (3): 403-452.

Week V. Lobbying: Purpose and Strategies (Class to be rescheduled: Feb. 24th)

Political Science Review 100 (1): 69-84.

American

Journal of Politics 79(4): 1162-1176.

Keith E. Schnakenberg. 2017 Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (1): 129-145.

https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/kangk/files/lobbyist_as_gatekeeper.pdf

Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational
American Political Science Review 114 (1): 179-205.

Recommended:

Marco Battaglini, and Eleonora Patacchini
Journal of Political Economy 126 (6): 2277-2322.

Journal

Week VI: Lobbying Coalitions and Venue Selections (March 2nd)

Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2012. Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy? *Journal of International Economics* 87 (1): 18-26.

Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard, and John Wiggs Patty. 2013 Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and Representation across Policy-Making Venues *Journal of Public Policy* 33 (1): 3-33.

Government Partners in Advocacy: Lobbyists and
Journal of Politics 77 (1): 202-215.

Journal of Politics 80 (2): Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/UTJGTF>

Congressional
Committee Agenda Setting. *Journal of Politics* 82 (1): 225-240.

Recommended:

Frederick J. Boehmke
Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy-
Political Science 1 (2): 139-169. *Quarterly Journal of*

American
Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 360-375.

Daniel P. Carpenter, Kevin M. Esterling, and David M. J. Lazer. 2004.
224-246. *Journal of Politics* 66 (1):

Week VII: Impacts of Lobbying (March 16th)

Deniz Igan and Prachi Mishra. 2014. "Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street: Political Influence and Financial Regulation," *Journal of Law and Economics* 57 (4): 1063-1084.

Karam Kang. 2016. Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector *Review of Economic Studies* 83 (1): 269-305.

Misallocation. Working paper.

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bc932127fdb8476acace36/t/5d2758615f0c0100019dc844/1562859617908/misallocation.pdf>

Stephane Wolton. 2019

Policy Choices. Working paper.

<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=735105085006006008086073113009066106120009055009062036075096126085093104127078092094009013096038009044113125094121084103121072031087031066093111012127097030010117125095077054021085083070011071093015108076104085118097030089111030104075107114075072102113&EXT=pdf>

David Martimort. 2020. 'When Olson Meets Dahl': From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming)
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428365>.

Recommended:

American Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 893-909.

S Campaign Finance Legislation and the Supply-side of the Revolving
Door *Political Science Research and Methods* (forthcoming)
https://simonweschle.github.io/papers/2019_PSRM_RD.pdf

Week IX. *Political Contributions Motivations for Giving* (March 30th)

Week X. *Political Contributions Impacts* (Apr. 6th)

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Journal of Finance 65 (2): 687-724.

Meng Gao, and Jiekun

Journal of Financial Economics 121 (3): 521-545.

Congressional Officials: A *American Journal of
Political Science* 60 (3): 545-558. Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/28582>

. Working paper.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/eqzk6tovci6b6es/avis_jmp.pdf?dl=0.

Anthony Fowler, H

Journal of Politics (forthcoming). Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FBQGWYI&version=&q=&fileTypeGroupFacet=&fileAccess=%22Public%22&fileTag=&fileSortField=&fileSortOrder=>

Recommended:

-Contracting
Political Analysis 19 (6): 325-341.
[Note, is an available supplemental appendix]

Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, and Tracy Yue Wang Corporate Political
Donations: Investment or Agency? *Business and Politics* 14 (1): Article 3.

Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, and Eva Pantaleon. 2012 Individual Political Contributions and Firm
Journal of Financial Economics 105 (2): 367-392.

Business and Politics 18 (4): 367-394. Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/6R1HAS>

