PSC 575: Topics in Political Economy

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Spring 2018, Rochester M, W 10:00-12:00 Harkness 112

Office Hours: T: 10-12 or by appointment

Course Outline: This course will focus on surveying and discussing applications of dynamic

Topics: I have included mostly those papers I think we may cover. Depending on class interests, we can be flexible with respect to the topics and papers covered as well as the

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- Bernhardt, D., O. Camara, and F. Squintani (2011). Competence and ideology. *Review of Economic Studies* 78 (2), 487-522.
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- Callander, S. (2007). Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting. *Review of Economic Studies 34* (1), 123-684.

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- Fong, P. (2008). Dynamics of government and policy choice. Working paper.
- Forand, J. (2014). Two-party competition with persistent policies. *Journal of Economic Theory* 152, 64-91.

Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2010). The war of information.

- Jack, W. and R. Lagunoff (2006). Dynamic enfranchisement. *Journal of Public Economics* 90 (4-5), 551-572.
- Kalandrakis, T. (2004). A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game. *Journal of Economic Theory 116* (2), 294-322.
- Kalandrakis, T. (2009a). A Reputational Theory of Two-Party Competition. *Quarterly Journal* of Political Science 4 (4), 343-378.
- Kalandrakis, T. (2009b). Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo. *International Journal of Game Theory* 39 (4), 617-643.
- Keppo, J. and L. Smith (2008). Optimal electoral timing: exercise wisely and you may live longer. *Review of Economic Studies* 45 (2), 616-628.
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