

University of Rochester Political Science

Psc 584
Game Theory

Prof. Mark Fey
Fall 2017

Syllabus

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This course is designed to teach graduate students in political science the

Topic 0 The Basic of Bargaining

Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 4.4

Gibbons, sec. 2.1.D

Ariel Rubinstein, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica 50:1 (1982), 97{110 (JSTOR)

John Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica* 18:21 (1950),
155{162 (JSTOR)

Topic 1 Bayesian Games and Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium

Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 6

Gibbons, ch. 3

John C. Harsanyi, "Games with Incomplete Information Played by
'Bayesian' Players, I-III," *Management Science* 14 (1967), 159{182,
320{334, 486{502 (JSTOR)

John C. Harsanyi, "Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new
rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points," *International Journal
of Game Theory* 2 (1973), 1-23

Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal, "Private incentives in
social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism,"
Journal of Public Economics 35 (1988) 309{332 (link)

Topic 2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium

Fudenberg and Tirole, ch. 8

Gibbons, sec. 4.1

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and
sequential equilibrium," *Journal of Economic Theory* 53 (1991),
236{260

Topic 3 Signaling Games

Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 11.2

Gibbons, sec. 7.1

Michael Spence, "Job Market Signaling," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87 (1973), 355{374 (JSTOR)

In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps, "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102 (1987), 179{222 (JSTOR)

Je rey S. Banks and Joel Sobel, "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," *Econometrica* 55 (1987), 647{661 (JSTOR)

David Epstein and Peter Zemski, "Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995), 295{308 (JSTOR)

Topic 4 Preplay Communication and Cheap Talk

Gibbons, sec. 4.3.A

Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, "Cheap Talk," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10 (1996), 103{118 (JSTOR)

Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission," *Econometrica* 50 (1982), 1431{1451 (JSTOR)

Topic 5 Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games

Dominance

Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 11.2

Gibbons, sec. 1.1.B

Nash Equilibrium

Fudenberg and Tirole, sec. 1.2{1.3

Gibbons, sec. 1.1.C & 1.3

John Nash, "Non-Cooperative Games," *Annals of Mathematics* 54 (1951), 286{295 (JSTOR)

Matthew O. Jackson, Leo K. Simon, Jeroen M. Swinkels, and William R. Zame, "Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information," *Econometrica* 70 (2002), 1711{1740 (JSTOR)

R. Selten, "Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games," *International Journal of Game Theory* 4 (1975), 25{55

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