A New Central Europe and Its Geopolitical Insurance Policies
By Piotr Kłodkowski
In 1984, Milan Kundera published his famous essay in French, “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” which was soon translated into many other languages. His view of the distant and not-so-distant past and its relation to the present is still relevant, despite the fact that history accelerated a few years later and, as it seemed, completely changed the shape of the entire Central and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union collapsed, new states arose from its ruins, Germany united, and Russia - as some hoped - was to become a democratic state. From today's perspective, however, we see that the political-cultural mechanisms that Kundera described fifty years ago are still in place, and the geopolitical situation has reminded us that we cannot escape history.
Kundera writes about Central Europe as a unique place on the Old Continent, which is located at the junction of the East and the West. It considers itself part of the West that was forcibly annexed by the East, which meant the Soviet Union at the time, although Kundera often uses the word "Russia," and the USSR was just another imperial incarnation of it. His analysis of Central Europe, in which he included Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland (Austria was more politically lucky), was to prove that these are not countries of the European "East," but constitute a separate cultural entity, distant from Russian civilization.
“Geographic Europe” (extending from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains) was always divided into two halves which evolved separately: one tied to ancient Rome and the Catholic Church, the other anchored in Byzantium and the Orthodox Church. After 1945, the border between the two Europes shifted several hundred kilometers to the west, and several nations that had always considered themselves to be Western woke up to discover that they were now in the East.
In his essay, the author does not mention Ukraine too often, especially its western part, which at that time seemed to be an inaccessible area, and which had earlier belonged to the Habsburg Empire, like Polish Galicia, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. These Central European nations existed in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century in the shadow of the Russian Empire, although not all of them perceived the Russian threat in the same way. Sometimes the Empire was considered, especially in Bohemia (Czechia), as a potential "Slavic" ally vis-à-vis the real or imagined German threat, the proverbial “Drang nach Osten,” or “Drive to the East.” However, what was acceptable for some representatives of the Czech intelligentsia was absolutely unacceptable for the majority of Poles, or at least for those who had some political experience. For them, Russia was always a threat, and any consideration of "Slavic solidarity" or "Pan-Slavism" was simply considered part of Moscow's imperial ideology. In this respect, they differed greatly from many other representatives of the Slavic nations, although at the beginning of the 20th century they may have shared the concerns about German dominance in the entire region. The problem was that from the perspective of Warsaw, Russia and later the Soviet Union were not perceived as a solid protection against Germany, so the solution would rather be to build a network of cooperation and political-military alliances among selected countries in Central and Central-Eastern Europe, which was postulated by Marshal Józef Piłsudski. This demand turned out to be impossible to implement in the 1920s and 1930s, for which many countries in the region later paid a high price.
The vision of Central Europe as a separate cultural and political entity matured for many years. Milan Kundera refers to Frantisek Palacky, the great historian and the figure most representative of Czech politics in the nineteenth century:
Central Europe, according to Palacky, ought to be a family of equal nations, each of which—treating the others with mutual respect and secure in the protection of a strong, unified state—would also cultivate its own individuality. And this dream, although never fully realized, would remain powerful and influential. Central Europe longed to be a condensed version of Europe itself in all its cultural variety, a small arch-European Europe, a reduced model of Europe made up of nations conceived according to one rule: the greatest variety within the smallest space. How could Central Europe not be horrified facing a Russia founded on the opposite principle: the smallest variety within the greatest space?
In the dark times of communism the idea of Central Europe, even if not very clearly defined, somehow united the region’s inhabitants, who felt that they were common victims of the Russian-Soviet empire. They could find comfort in history, interpreted in many different ways, not always with care for political realism. Various ideas of building a commonwealth of Central and Eastern Europe (although not necessarily in the shape suggested by Kundera) had existed earlier and were propagated by ideologues and politicians in the first half of the 20th century. The point of reference, as much later, was always Russia or the Soviet Union, although the threat from Germany was also taken into account. For many Poles from the eastern areas of pre-partition Poland, it was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, whose political and ethnic structure and legacy should be remembered and possibly revived in a new shape in order to stop the always possible Russian expansion. The imagined and postulated borders of Central Europe could therefore be fluid, but one thing was certain: this is an area located in a sensitive place of the Old Continent, between Germany and Russia (the Soviet Union). However, the shared fate of the countries of Central Europe did not exclude the fact of real and conflicting national interests, or at least that was how it was perceived not only by politicians or ideologues, but also by many ordinary citizens of the newly independent states after the First World War.
Central Europe and The Two Visions of “Nationalism”
It should therefore come as no surprise that the idea of a strong cooperation between the countries of Central Europe, or even of building a political Federation of Central Europe, of which Piłsudski dreamed, clashed with the idea of ethnic nationalism, whose growing popularity made it difficult or even impossible to form a common alliance in Central-Eastern Europe at that time. Roman Dmowski, the leading ideologue of Polish nationalism, assumed that weaker nations should give way to stronger nations, which in such a situation would play a decisive role at home or on the international scene. No wonder that the "majority nation" (meaning “the stronger nation” in Dmowski’s view) did not guarantee de facto (although perhaps did de jure) equal rights for representatives of national minorities, which in the Second Polish Republic constituted almost one third of the population. Tensions between different communities, which resulted largely from the adopted ideology of nationalism, also had international implications. The lack of trust of Poles in Lithuanians, Czechs, Ukrainians, Jews and vice versa was in no way conducive to building a network of international cooperation treaties in the face of the imminent threat from both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Fear of a common enemy did not lead to tightening the ties of cooperation among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which turned out to be tragic for all, although not for all to the same degree. After all, Czechoslovakia did not suffer the same fate as Poland during World War II.
Józef Piłsudski’s conception of “a new commonwealth” or a federation was generally based on the traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He could refer also to The Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian (Ukrainian and Belorussian) Commonwealth, which was only a proposed project of a powerful European State in the 17th century that would have replaced the existing Commonwealth but that never actually got beyond the stage of political planning. At present, it is difficult to conclude whether such a state could have become a coherent political entity, ready to compete with Moscow, but this ambitious project would certainly have changed the balance of power in Eastern Europe. Ultimately, the defeat of the Commonwealth in the 18th century enabled the expansion of the Russian Empire. Piłsudski knew history well and understood that an effective barrier against Russia's expansion in its new Soviet avatar would be the Central European Federation, which would constitute a significant political and military force. He contemplated also a federation or even an alliance with the Baltic and Balkan states, which would include not only Central European countries, but also Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece. In fact, the initial plan went through many modifications and would cover at one time the territories lying between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas, hence the name “Intermarium”, which is a Latin phrase for “Between the Seas” (Polish Międzymorze). These vaguely defined political projects never materialized. They did not seriously catch the attention of the Poles, nor the representatives of other nations who after WWI were focused on their own national interests to be pursued independently. Unfortunately, Poland was then perceived very distrustfully as a country trying to "Polonize" ethnic minorities within its own borders, which was indeed the plan of the supporters of Dmowski's vision of an independent Republic. Any idea of an inclusive civic community within the Commonwealth, which was supposed to be, after all, a cross-cultural, multi-linguistic and international entity, would therefore be difficult to accept not only for Poles, but most probably by Lithuanians or Ukrainians as well. It was not a favorable time for overly ambitious visionaries who wished to recreate the old states with a complex ethnic, political and social structure which would seem incompatible with the interwar reality. Besides, Poland was by no means an economic superpower, so it was hard to expect it to become the main player in this part of Europe and to attract other, smaller players.
Unlike Dmowski, Piłsudski did not come up with a detailed political plan to implement his own vision of the Federation, which was certainly a serious obstacle in building realistic political strategies for the future. Paul Brykczynski in his essay on two different conceptions of nationalism explains:
Volumes have been written on the legacy of both Dmowski and Piłsudski. However, the treatment the two men have received from historians thus far has been rather asymmetrical. While Dmowski’s political thought has been carefully and systematically scrutinized, Piłsudski’s life remains primarily a domain of biographers (and hagiographers) or, at best, political and military historians. This is somewhat understandable. Dmowski was a publicist and theoretician; having spent most of his life in opposition, he expressed himself primarily in print. Piłsudski, on the other hand, was an eminent man of action, a revolutionary, a general and, later, a dictator. He despised abstract theory and, despite being a prolific writer, he had no need to expound his ideas in a theoretical or systematic manner. (A Poland for the Poles? Józef Piłsudski and the Ambiguities of Polish Nationalism.)
So finally, the inclusive and probably too idealistic vision of Piłsudski lost to the hard, realistic vision of Dmowski. And this despite the fact that Piłsudski was the undisputed leader of Poland from 1926 until his death in 1935, and Dmowski was a classic man of writing, and certainly not a political activist. However, his works, carefully crafted, had great political power. The idea of ethnic rather than civic nationalism turned out to be victorious.
The period of communism practically prevented any public debates on possible alliances in Central Europe that would protect the identity and security of the inhabitants of this part of the continent. It was Moscow, according to its own propaganda, that was supposed to guarantee the security of the western borders of Central European countries. These arguments were readily accepted not only by communist hardliners but also by many average Poles, Czechs or Slovaks who did not hold positive views about post-Nazi Germany. Not surprisingly, any public debates about Poland’s eastern borders were practically taboo and any sentiments regarding the former lands of the Second Polish Republic could only be cultivated in private conversations. Besides, Ukraine and Belarus seemed to belong to a different world, completely under Soviet tutelage.
Fortunately, it was Jerzy Giedroyc, a Polish writer and the editor of the highly influential Paris-based periodical, Kultura, who emphasized the importance of independent Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus in the process of building a stable Central Europe, without the imperial presence of Russia or the Soviet Union. Giedroyc openly proclaimed his theses long before the collapse of the Soviet Union, recognizing the inviolability of the post-war borders, which in turn was criticized by many Polish emigre activists who dreamed of returning to Poland within the pre-1939 borders. Giedroyc's political position was upheld by successive governments of the Third Republic of Poland, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which unreservedly recognized the independence of Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus within the present borders. Even if sentiments related to the Polish history of Lviv and Vilnius still enjoy some popularity, they have no political significance in practice. Poles had to finally come to terms with the reality of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century.
The Visegrád Group and fundamental ideological differences
The expected cooperation within the Visegrád Group (V-4) seemed to be a relatively easier task. Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary had a lot in common, and great sympathy in people-to-people contacts also played an important role in the process of strengthening the grouping. Initially, mutual relations were not burdened with political problems, and common membership in the European Union facilitated lobbying for the interests of Central Europe. The common position of the V-4 on the immigration crisis in 2015 aroused much controversy, but it certainly dynamized mutual contacts at the political level. Strict control of migration from non-European countries has become a common V-4 demand that has gained recognition among many right-wing parties in the European Union. Soon, however, it turned out that the common history and destiny of Central Europe is not as unique as Kundera postulated. Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, chose the pro-Russian option, and Moscow's influence on Hungarian policy became something anomalous and extremely controversial in the entire European Union. Strong pro-Russian sentiments in Slovakia are also a problem for Poland, although they do not have much impact on Bratislava's foreign policy at present. It is possible, however, that this will change in the near future. The Russian invasion of Ukraine only exacerbated political and ideological differences within the V-4, and contributed to reducing the dynamics of cooperation. Neither Budapest nor Bratislava nor Prague feel an existential threat from Moscow, which in turn is a grim reality for Warsaw (and nowadays even more for Kyiv). This will certainly inhibit further cooperation, and perhaps also make the V-4 a defunct organization, at least for a period of time. What is probably most important is lowering the level of trust in each other at the political and military level. It is difficult to trust a country like Hungary, which wants to maintain friendly relations with Russia, a classic aggressor country that poses a serious threat to the stability of Eastern Europe. Milan Kundera must have been very disappointed.
Intermarium versus Trimarium
The idea of Intermarium, even if not precisely defined, returned to politics in the second decade of the 21st century. In 2015 President Andrzej Duda proposed an alliance of EU member states of Central-Eastern Europe and a greater commitment of NATO in the region. He openly referred to Józef Piłsudski and Jerzy Giedroyc as the creative authors of the Intermarium. A year later, The Three Seas Initiative (Trimarium, 3S Initiative, 3SI), a modernized version of the Intermarium conception, was launched in Dubrovnik by President Duda and Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. It is a forum of twelve EU member-states whose principal aim is to create and develop multi-level cooperation between all countries involved. Three main areas for the implementation of joint projects have been identified: transportation, energy and digital. The Trimarium raised objections from many Central European politicians (especially in Czechia and Croatia), but also caught the attention of American and Chinese leaders. President Trump participated in the 3SI Second Summit in 2017, and the Chinese delegation a year earlier had spoken about the interconnectedness of The Three Seas Initiative with its own gigantic project of the “Belt and Road.” It should be added that the Trimarium does not arouse any particular enthusiasm in Poland, which, however, is a consequence of internal political divisions, and not of the concept itself.
The 3S Initiative is primarily a large economic project, without a military component, but it will nevertheless have some impact on the balance of power in eastern and central Europe. In 2022, after the Russian invasion, Ukraine was invited to actively participate in the Initiative and during the seventh summit in Riga in June it was officially granted the status of a partner-participant, which means that it will not be very long before it will become a full member of the Trimarium.
While the 3SI plays an important role in strengthening economic ties between its members, it obviously does not provide much protection against Russia's aggressive policy. While the fundamental protection of the sovereignty and stability of Central European countries, the Baltic and Nordic states is guaranteed by NATO, especially by the United States, it cannot be ruled out that the international situation will sooner or later force closer cooperation between countries directly threatened by aggressive Russia. US involvement in a possible conflict with China may weaken the American presence on NATO's eastern flank, which will not necessarily be compensated by the military presence of other allies. It is hard to deny that Russia poses no serious threat to Portugal, Italy, Spain or even France, so their active military assistance to allies in the east of the continent in a conflict situation may therefore be quite limited. In other words, the countries of Central, Eastern and Northern Europe need an additional insurance policy, certainly within NATO, but assuming the most pessimistic scenario, i.e. a possible conflict in Europe and the Indo-Pacific at the same time. Large-scale regional conflicts may have global implications, which in turn will affect the course of these conflicts and probably determine their final outcome. And finally, we cannot rule out that the United States may turn to the old principle of isolationism in the near future, even if it appears very unlikely now. This new-old American isolationism would have very negative consequences, especially for the countries of Central, Eastern and Northern Europe. We should be aware that even if Russia has lost much of its military potential since February 2022, over the next decade it will most probably be able to make up for the losses (although it won't make up for the loss of human lives) and learn from its own incredible strategic and tactical mistakes during the invasion of Ukraine.
A New Geopolitical Insurance Policy
The idea of a Poland-Ukraine-Baltic States Alliance (in a broader version reinforced with post-Lukashenka Belarus) is naturally associated with the era of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the vaguely defined conception of Marshal Piłsudski, and finally with the wise postulates of Jerzy Giedroyc. However, this is not about realizing any imperial vision, nor about creating some super-state. It is about building a durable military and political entity that would discourage Russia from aggression towards Europe. The military component would play a vital role, but it will necessarily have political and economic implications. Of course, the matter is quite complex due to the commitments of NATO members, which limit their potential initiatives in a country that is not a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, and it should be emphasized that the whole conception and its implementation makes sense only in cooperation with the European Union (and of course with NATO), and not - which would be political suicide - against it. Thus, the construction of a powerful Polish-Ukrainian – Baltic States – Nordic “defensive wall” seems to be a strategic necessity, even if the detailed specification of this strategic project of the “New Commonwealth” could take a lot of time and consume a lot of political energy on both sides. Poland and Ukraine, as well as Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Finland are in a similar danger zone, so now it's up to them to make a move on this part of the world chessboard.
It needs to be stressed that political and military decisions are not made in a socio-ideological vacuum. Reshaping and developing new alliances and building a network of military cooperation require, which is not always visible at first glance, a modification of one's own vision of nationalism. Focusing on narrow national interests based on the old exclusive ideas of ethnicity (as propagated by Dmowski) will not facilitate the process of forming a common strategic defensive wall against an aggressive Russia. Old prejudices and deep-seated distrust can resurface and discourage closer cooperation. Promoting a new vision of inclusive, civic nationalism (as propagated by Piłsudski) should become a priority, because this will contribute to building a real community of Central and Eastern European countries (with the addition of Finland and Sweden), which will soon understand that “united we stand, divided we fall.” It is certainly quite a long psychological, social and political process, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the solidarity of many Central and Eastern Europeans with the struggling and suffering Ukrainians have proven that this is the only viable option at the moment. Milan Kundera would probably agree, although his definition of Central Europe in the third decade of the 21st century could perhaps be different. But who knows, maybe not?
Dr. Piotr Kłodkowski was visiting professor in the Skalny Center in 2019, 2021, and 2023. He is professor at the Centre for Comparative Studies of Civilizations, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland. He served as the Polish Ambassador to India from 2009-14. 2021 and 2023.