IR 215: Corruption and Good Governance

Instructor: Olesya Tkacheva

Tuesday and Thursday, 4:50-6:05PM

Harkness Hall 115

Office Hours: Thursday, 2:00-3:00PM and by appointment

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<u>Course description</u>: Why does corruption flourish in some countries but not in others? Why do voters elect corrupt politicians? When do anti-corruption reforms succeed and when do they fail? Does the structure of corrupt networks differ in democratic and non-democratic countries? When and how can the Internet be used for combating corruption? This course lays out the foundation

vol. 49, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 22-32.

- Staffan Andersson and Paul M. Heywood, The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International's A *Political Studies*, vol. 57, no. 4 (December 2009): 746-767.
- Mireille Razafindrakoto and Francois Roubaud, Are International Databases on Corruption Reliable? A Comparison of Expert Opinion Surveys and Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa, *World Development*, vol. 38, no. 8 ber

Suggested:

Pranab Bardha *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 35, no.3 (September 1997): 1320-1346.

Part III: Corruption and Elections (Weeks 5-8: February 8-March 1)

A. Background (Week 5: February 8-10)

Gary King, *Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), Introduction.

Thomas H. Wonnacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott, *Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics* (New York: John Willey and Sons, 1990), Chapters 11 and 12.

B. Elections and Electoral Systems (Weeks 6-8: February 15-March 1)

John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart,

Electoral Studies 14, no. 4 (April 1995): 417-439.

Miriam A Golden,

Daniel W. Gingerich, Ballot Structure, Political Corruption, and the Performance of Proportional *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, vol. 21, no. 4 (October 2009): 509-541.

Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, -Politicians Linkages: In Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Midterm: March 3 (in class)

Part IV: Corruption in Non-Democracies (Week 9: March 15-17)

Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes at https://www.msu.edu/~echang/Research/chang_golden_authoritarian_SSQ.pdf

China Review, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring

2010): 157-82.

Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and Modes of Covert Influence," in Arnold Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, eds., *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

: Different Legacies of Central -Ackerman, ed., *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption* (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006).

Tomas Larsson, Reform, Corruption, and Growth: Why Corruption is More Devastating in Russia than in China

Part V: Other Determinants of Corruption (Weeks 10-11)

A. Fragmentation of State (Week 10: March 22-24)

Simon Political Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from around the World *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 93, no. 1-2 (February 2009): 14-34.

Lessmann Christian and Gunther Markwardt, One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats *World Development*, vol. 38, no. 4 (April 2010): 631-46.

Comparative Political Studies, vol. 37 no. 1 (February 2004):

55-87.