

Political Science 272: Theories of International Relations
Thurs.-Tues., 9:40-10:55.

Spring 2010

Randall Stone
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Rochester
randall.stone@rochester.edu

Office Hours: Tues-Thurs. 11-11:30,
Thurs., 1:30-3:00,
Harkness Hall 336, tel. 273-4761

TA: Shawn Ramirez, sramire2@mail.rochester.edu

Purpose of the course: This course surveys approaches to theory building in international relations, and introduces students to elementary game theory. Major topics include the causes of war, the conditions for international cooperation, and the role of international institutions. This is an advanced course; some previous course work in international relations or international history is assumed. *This course satisfies the Political Science requirement for Formal Theory.*

Course Requirements: It is essential to complete the required reading. There will be a midterm exam on March 4, a final exam, two problem sets to familiarize students with game theory, due Friday, February 26, and Monday, April 12, and a short (4-page) paper due Monday, April 19. Attendance at lectures and in discussion secti

Week One

Thurs., Jan. 14: Theories of International Relations

Week Two

Tues., Jan. 19: Understanding Waltz

Thurs., Jan. 21: The Case for Structural Realism

- *Discussion sections cover*
 - Waltz, Chpts. 1-4.

Week Three

Tues., Jan. 26: Critiques of Structural Realism

Thurs., Jan. 28: No Class

- *Discussion sections cover*
 - Waltz, Chpts. 5-9
 - Gaddis, John Lewis. "[The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System.](#)" *International Security* 10, No. 4. (Spring, 1986): 99-142.
 - Milner, Helen. 1991. "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations: A Critique." *Review of International Studies* 17 (1) (January): 67-85.
 - Wendt, Alexander, "[Anarchy is What States Make of It,](#)" *International Organization* 46 (Spring, 1992): 391-425.

Week Four

Tues., Feb. 2: Rational Choice: Preferences, Utilities, Lotteries, Expected Utility

Thurs., Feb. 4: Strategic Form Games & Nash Equilibrium

- *Discussion sections cover*
 - Kreps, [Game Theory and Economic Modeling.](#)

Week Five

Tues. Feb. 9: Hegemonic Stability and International Cooperation

Thurs., Feb. 11: Extensive Form Games & Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

- *Discussion sections cover*

- Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984). Chpts. 3, 8.
- Snidal, Duncan. "The Limitations of Hegemonic Stability Theory." International Organization 39 (1985): 579-614.

Week Six

Tues. Feb. 16: Repeated Games

Thurs., Feb. 18: Repeated Games Continued

- *Discussion sections cover*

- Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modeling, Chpt. 3.
- Keohane, After Hegemony, Chpts. 4-6
- Stone, Randall W., Branislav Slantchev and Tamar London. "[Choosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public-Goods Model of International Relations](#)". *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2) (June 2008): 335-62.

Week Seven

Tues. Feb. 23: The Case for Functionalist Institutionalism

