PSC 508 Estimating Games & Testing Formal Models

Spring 2009 Wed, 12:30-3:15

Prof. Curtis S. Signorino

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PURPOSE: Scholars of political science, economics, and business are increasingly interested in the empirical analysis of and/or "testing" of formal

1. Models, Empirical Analysis, and Epistemology

1.1 Formal Models: What Are They? Why Do We Use Them?

Von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern. 1972. *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Chapter 1.

Kreps, David M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Chapter 1.

RBM. Chapters 1-3.

Walt, Stephen M. 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security* 23(4): 548. Read all responses and Walt's reply.

Roger Myerson. 2001. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science." *Rationality and Society* 4(1): 62-73.

1.2 History, Illustration, and Analytic Narratives

Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Intro, Greif, Weingast

Carpenter, Daniel. 2000. "Commentary: What Is the Marginal Value of Analytic Narratives?" *Social Science History* 24(4): 653-667.

Skocpol, Theda. 2000. "Commentary: Theory Tackles History." *Social Science History* 24(4): 669-676.

Parikh, Sunita. 2000. "Commentary: The Strategic Value of Analytic Narratives." *Social Science History* 24(4): 677-684.

Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. 2000. "Analytic Narratives Revisited." *Social Science History* 24(4): 685-696.

1.3 What Exactly Are We Doing? Empirically Evaluating? Analyzing? Testing? Models

Fogel, Robert W. 1966. "A New Economic History," reprinted in Fritz Stern, ed. 1973. The

Clinton, Joshua and Adam Meirowitz. 2003. "Integrating Voting Theory and Roll Call Analysis." *Political Analysis*. 11:381-396.

Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data." *American Political Science Review* 98:355-370.



Aradillas-Lopez, Andres. 2008. "Semiparametric Estimation of a Simultaneous Game with Incomplete Information." Working paper.

8. Auctions

Laffont, J.-J., H. Ossard, and Q. Vuong. 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," *Econometrica*, 63, 953—980.

Laffont, J.-J., and Q. Vuong. 1996. "Structural Analysis of Auction Data," *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 86, 414—420.

Laffont, J.-J. 1997. "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," *European Economic Review*, 41, 1—35.

Porter, R. 1995. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," *Econometrica* 63(1): 1-27.

Guerre, E., I. M. Perrigne, and Q. Vuong. 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," *Econometrica*, 68, 525—574.

Li, T., I Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. 2002. "Structural Estimation of the Affiliated Private Value Auction Model." *RAND Journal of Economics*. 33:171-193.

Athey, S. and J. Levin. 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions." *Journal of Political Economy* 109(2): 375-417.

Hendricks, K., Pinkse, J. and Porter, R. 2003. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First Price Common Value Auctions." *Review of Economic Studies* 70-1, 242, pp. 115-146.

Hong, H. and Shum, M. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement." *Review of Economic Studies* 69(4), pp 871-898.

Bajari, Patrick, and Ali Hortacsu. 2005. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data." *Journal of Political Economy* 113(4): 703-741. Athey, Susan and Philip A. Haile. 2007. "Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions." in J. Heckman and E. Leamer, eds, *Handbook of Econometrics*, Vol 6A. Elsevier. Ch 60. Pp3847-3965.

Hendricks, K. and R. H. Porter. Forthcoming. "An Empirical Perspective on Auctions." in *Handbook of Industrial Organization*

9.3 Government Formation

Merlo, Antonio. 1997. "Bargaining over Government in a Stochastic Environment." *Journal of Political Economy* 105:101-131.

Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo. 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formatioin." *Econometrica* 71(1): 27-70.

9.4 Multiple Agents

R. Ericson and A. Pakes. 1995. "Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work." *Review of Economic Studies* 62: 5382.

Berry, S., S. Levinson, and A. Pakes. 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium." *Econometrica* 63:841-890.

V. Aguirregabiria and P. Mira. 2002. "Swapping the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm: A Class of Estimators for Discrete Markov Decision Models." *Econometrica* 70: 15191543.

Ryan, S. 2005. "The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry." Working paper.

V. Aguirregabiria and P. Mira. 2007. "Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games." *Econometrica* 75: 153.

Bajari, P. Benkard, C.L. and Levin, J.D. 2007. "Estimating Dynamic Games of Imperfect Competition." *Econometrica* 75: 13311370.

Jofre-Bonet, M. and Pesendorfer, M. "Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game." *Econometrica*, forthcoming.

10. Multiple Equilibria

Jovanovic, B. 1989. "Observable Implications of Models with Multiple Equilibria." *Econometrica*. 57(6):1431-1437.

Tamer, E. T. 2003. "Incomplete Bivariate Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria." *Review of Economic Studies* 70: 147-167.

Cooper, Russell W. 2005 "Estimation and Identification of Structural Parameters in the Presence of Multiple Equilibri-1 (l) -1 (e) -1 (l) -2 /F1.0 f (i) -6 (m) 1 p(in l) -1 8i.f Il Stud3-2 (-1 (u) 2 (:) -2 (-1 (i) -1 (i

12. American Politics

Mebane, Walter R. Jr. 2000. "Coordination, Moderation and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections." *American Political Science Review* 94.

Groseclose, Tim, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:100-119.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2001. "Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:532-550.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48:690-706.

Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo. 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." *American Economic Review* 95(1): 347-373.

Gordon, Sanford C., and Catherine Hafer. 2005. "Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 99: 245-261. Krehbiel, Keith. 2007. "Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game." *American Journal of Political Science* 51:231-240.

Clinton, Joshua. 2007. "Lawmaking and Roll Calls." *The Journal of Politics*. 69(2):457-469. Patty, John W. 2008. "Equilibrium Party Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 52:636-655.

Primo, David M., Sarah A. Binder, and Forrest Maltzman. 2008. "Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection." *American Journal of Political Science* 52:471-489.

13. International Relations

TBD

Work on Paper & Presentation: No Class, 4/22

Project Presentation: Last Class, 4/29

Paper Due: End of Reading Period, 5/3