

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Pol. Sci. 5
Professor Rothenberg

Fall 0

INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

Purpose

Week I: Introduction. (Sept. 1th)

Week III. *Micro-Foundations* (Sept. 1st).

Jack Walker. . *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*. Chapter 5.

Robert C. Lowry. . "The Private Production of Public Goods: Organizational Maintenance, Managers' Objectives, and Collective Goals," *American Political Science Review* 100 -

Robert C. Lowry. . Foundation Patronage toward Citizen Groups and Think Tanks: Who Gets Grants? *Journal of Politics* 71(5) - - .

Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray. 2000. 'Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox,' *American Political Science Review* 95 - - .

Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi. 2000. 'The Group Size Paradox Revisited,' *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 20(5) - - .

Asproudis, Elias. 2000. 'Revisiting Environmental Groups and Members' Behaviour: Budget, Size and (Im)pure Altruism,' *Environmental Economics and Policy Studies* 12(1) - - .

Note: Please be familiar with the basic logic of collective action at least to the level of Olson (1965); if not, review Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action*, Chs. 1, 2, 3. There are also a variety of other works in this tradition as well to which I would be happy to provide citations.

Week IV.

Week VI Lobbying--Coalitions and Venue Selections (Oct. 10th)

Thomas Holyoke. 2000. Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation, *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (1) 10-25.

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. 2000. Competition and Political Organization

Week VIII.

Week IX. *Political Contributions—Impacts* (Nov. 2nd)

Randall L. Kroszner and Thomas Stratmann. . Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees. *American Economic Review* - .

Justin Fox and Lawrence Rothenberg. 0 . Influence without Bribes: A Non-Contracting Model of Campaign Giving and Policymaking; *Political Analysis* , 5 , 0 .
-Note is an available supplemental appendix₇

Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, and Eva Pantaleoni. 0 . Individual Political Contributions and Firm Performance; working paper.

Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, and Tracy Yue Wang. 0 . Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency? *Business and Politics* () Article .

-Will probably add one paper₇

Week X-XI. *Lobbying the Bureaucracy*. (Nov. 9th and Nov. 16th).

Ernest del Bo and Rafael Di Tella. 00 . Capture by Threat, *Journal of Political Economy* - 5 .

Daniel P. Carpenter. 00 . Protection without Capture Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator, *American Political Science Review* - .

Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer. 005. Flexing Muscle Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy, *American Political Science Review* 5- .

Sanford C. Gordon, and Catherine Hafer. 00-. Corporate Influence and the Regulatory Mandate, *Journal of Politics* () 00- .

Morten Bennedsen and Sven E. Feldmann. 00 . Lobbying Bureaucrats, *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*
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Week XII. *Interest Groups and the EU* (Nov. 0th). Papers Tbd.

Week XIII. *Private Politics* (Dec. th)

David Baron. 00 . Private Politics; *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* -

David Baron and Daniel Diermeier. 00₂. Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy;
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy () 5 - .

David P. Baron. 0 . The Industrial Organization of Private Politics; *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(1)-119-136-2.12.
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Week XV. Student Presentations (TBD).

Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech.

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