

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Pol. Sci. 513  
Professor Rothenberg

Spring 2016

INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

*P r o* : This course principally introduces students to the makeup of the group type and political economy (one of the areas that groups are often viewed as understudied is bec

## Weekly Assignments

*Introduction* (Jan. 15<sup>th</sup>)

*Academy of Political Science* (Jan. 22<sup>nd</sup>)

Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. LaPira, and Nicholas A. Semanko. 2005. "Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy," *Political Quarterly* 58 (1): 19-30.

Gregory M. Randolph and Michael T. Tasto. 2012. "Special Interest Group Formation in the United States: Do Special Interest Groups Mirror the Success of their Spatial Neighbors," *Journal of Political Economy* 120 (2): 119-134.

David Lowery, Virginia Gray, and James Monogan.. 2008. "The Construction of Interest Communities: Distinguishing Bottom-Up and Top-Down Models," *Journal of Political Economy* 116 (4): 1160-1176.

Frederick J. Boehmke, and Daniel C. Bowen. 2010. "Direct Democracy and Individual Interest Group Membership," *Journal of Political Economy* 118 (3): 659-671.

Lee Drutman, Matt Grossmann, and Tim LaPira. 2014. "The Interest Group Top Tier: More Groups, Concentrated Clout," working paper.

of *Journal of Public Economics* (Jan. 29<sup>th</sup>).

Jack Walker. 1991. *Behavioral Economics: A Handbook*. Chapter 5.

Robert C. Lowry. 1997. "The Private Production of Public Goods: Organizational Maintenance, Managers' Objectives, and Collective Goals," *American Political Science Review* 91: 308-323.

Robert C. Lowry. 1999. "Foundation Patronage toward Citizen Groups and Think Tanks: Who Gets Grants?" *Journal of Political Economy* 107: 758-776.

Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray. 2001. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox," *American Political Science Review* 95: 663-672.

Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi. 2008. "The Group Size Paradox Revisited," *Journal of Public Economics* 10 (5): 785-799.

Note: Please be familiar with the basic logic of collective action at least to the level of Olson (1965); if not, review Mancur Olson. *Logic of Collective Action*, Chs. 1, 2, and 6. There are also a variety of other works in this tradition as well to which I would be happy to provide citations. Here are three recent reviews of collective action theory:

Paul Pecorino. 2015. "Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* at Fifty," *Public Choice* 162: 243-262.

Luis Medina. 2013. "The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action," <https://doi.org/10.4986/r2.3678>

*V*

Week V. Lobbying: Purpose and Strategy (Feb. 12<sup>th</sup>)

David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright. 1994. "Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:25-44; Frank Baumgartner and Brian Leech, "Multiple Ambiguities of Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 521-542; and Austen-Smith and Wright, "Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 543-564.

Richard L. Hall, and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100 (1): 69-84.

Richard L. Hall, and Molly E. Reynolds. 2012. "Targeted Issue Advertising and Legislative Strategy: The Inside Ends of Outside Lobbying." *Journal of Politics* 74 (3): 888-902.

Hye Young You 2015. "Ex Post Lobbying," working paper.

Keith E. Schnakenberg. 2015. "Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting," working paper.

No Class Feb. 19<sup>th</sup>

Week VI: Lobbying--Coalitions and Venue Selection (Feb. 26<sup>th</sup>)

Week VII: Impacts of Lobbying (March 4th)

Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, and Jeffrey F. Timmons. 2009. "Lobbying and Taxes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (4): 893-909.

Daniel E. Bergan. 2009. "Does Grassroots Lobbying Work?: A Field Experiment Measuring the Effects of an e-Mail Lobbying Campaign on Legislator Behavior," *American Politics Research* 37 (2): 327-352.

Erin Grossmann,

Week VIII. Personnel: The Revolving Door (March 1<sup>th</sup>)

Bruce E. Cain and Lee Drutman. 2012. "Congressional Staff and the Revolving Door: The Impact of Regulatory Change." *Election Law Journal*. 13(1): 27-44.

Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Feijen. 2012. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." *American Economic Review* 102(7): 3731-48.

Jin-Hyuk Kim. 2013. "Determinants of post-congressional lobbying Employment." *Economics of Governance* 14 (2): 107-126.

Ed deHaan, Kevin Koh, Simi Kedia, and Shivaram Rajgopal. 2014. "Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC's Enforcement Outcomes? Initial Evidence from Civil Litigation," working paper.

Simon Luechinger, and Christoph Moser. 2014. "The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market." *Journal of Public Economics* 119 (November): 93-107.

David Lucca, Amit Seru, and Francesco Trebbi. 2014. "The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 65 (July): 17-32, and Comment by Edward J. Kane, 33-35.



Week IX. Political Contributions—Motivations for Giving (March 25<sup>th</sup>)

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Pork for Sale," *American Economic Review* 84: 833-50.

Nolan McCarty and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2001. *Political Analysis*. "The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing," 8:230-259.

Sanford Gordon, Catherine Hafer, and Dimitri Landolt. 2007. "On the Motivations for Political Giving," *Journal of Politics* 69 (4): 1057-1072.

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. 2011. "Is it for Me or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," *Journal of Public Economics* 95(7-8): 587-611.

Michael Barber, Forthcoming. "Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology," *Political Research Quarterly*.

Kishore Gawande and Christopher Magee. 2012. "Riding and Protection for Sale," *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (4): 735-747.

Week X. Political Contributions—Impacts (Apr. 8<sup>th</sup>)

Randall L. Kroszner and Thomas Stratmann. 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees." *American Economic Review* 88: 1163-1187.

Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen, and Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov. 2010. "Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns," *Journal of Finance* 65 (2): 687-724..

Justin Fox and Lawrence Rothenberg. 2011. "Influence without Bribes: A Non-Contracting Model of Campaign Giving and Policymaking," *Political Analysis* 19, 325-341, 2011. [Note is an available supplemental appendix]

Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, and Eva Pantaleoni. 2012. "Individual Political Contributions and Firm Performance," *Journal of Financial Economics* 105 (2): 367-392.

Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, and Tracy Yuen. 2012. "Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?" *Business and Politics* 14 (1): Article 3.

NO CLASS April 8



Week XIII. Private Politics and Student Presentations (April 29<sup>th</sup> [if possible])

David Baron and Daniel Diermeier. 2007. "Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy."