meetings: | Wednesdays, 2:00 - 4:40, Gavet 208 |
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prof: | Stu Jordan |
email: | stuart.jordan@rochester.edu |
office: | Harkness 316 |
office hours: | Mondays, 11:15 to 1:15 |
Contents
There are no official pre-requisites for this class. But I strongly recommend that you come in with some background in game theory or microeconomic theory. If you have taken one or more of the following, you should be fine:
If you have taken NONE of the above, you should at least feel comfortable with math and problem sets. For instance, if you've taken none of the above, this course might not be a good fit for you unless you've taken multi-variable calculus or other higher-level math classes.
To complete the course, you must:
Each student in the course will be assigned to one of two groups -- group "A" and group "B". Students in both groups must do all problem sets, and all students must do both the paper due on October 3 and the paper due on December 11. After that, you have three more paper assignments to do, but which ones depends on the group to which you're assigned. You'll see in the Schedule below that for each of our meetings there are two assignments listed: one for group A and one for group B. You must turn in only the assignments listed for your group, and your grade will be based only on those assignments.
Problem sets are due at the beginning of class on the day indicated by the schedule. Paper due dates vary from one assignment to another. I do not accept late assignments. Assignments turned in after the deadline will be marked '0' (the lowest possible score). Every paper must:
This course is going to use "peer review" to help you improve your writing. Peer review sessions will be held on dates marked below as "peer review sessions." Attendance at lecture is MANDATORY for all students on those days. I reserve the right to lower your grade by up to 1 full grade point if you fail to attend these sessions multiple times or without sufficient reason.
Every assignment (both problem sets and papers) is graded on a 4 point scale. At the end of the semester I drop your lowest problem set score. I then calculate a final 4 point score as a weighted average in which each of the three counted problem sets gets a weight of 0.05, and each of the five papers gets a weight of .20*0.85. The resulting 4-point overall score, is then coverted to a letter grade according to the following rules:
Overall 4 Point Score | Final Letter Grade |
at or above 3.85 | A |
at or above 3.5, less than 3.85 | A- |
at or above 3.15, less than 3.5 | B+ |
at or above 2.85, less than 3.15 | B |
at or above 2.5, less than 2.85 | B- |
at or above 2.15, less than 2.5 | C+ |
at or above 1.85, less than 2.15 | C |
at or above 1.5, less than 1.85 | C- |
at or above 1, less than 1.5 | D |
less than 1 | E |
If you wish, you may revise and resubmit one of the papers you write for re-grading. To be considered, it must be sumbitted within 7 days of me returning the graded original to you.
Date | Reviewers | Reviewees |
10/17 | group B | group A |
10/24 | group A | group B |
10/31 | group B | group A |
11/7 | group A | group B |
12/5 | group B | group A |
12/12 | group A | group B |
Date | Group A | Group B |
9/19, beginning of class | problem set 1 | problem set 1 |
9/26, beginning of class | problem set 2 | problem set 2 |
10/3, beginning of class | paper on Downs | paper on Downs |
10/10, beginning of class | problem set 3 | problem set 3 |
10/16, 11:59pm | paper on Ferejohn | nothing |
10/23, 11:59pm | nothing | paper on Fearon |
10/29, 11:59pm | paper on CW | nothing |
11/5, 11:59pm | nothing | paper on GH |
11/14, beginning of class | problem set 4 | problem set 4 |
11/28, beginning of class | paper on PT | paper on PT |
12/4, 11:59pm | paper on LW | nothing |
12/11, 11:59pm | nothing | paper on DL |
topic: | Intro to the Course |
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topic: | Basics of Rational Choice Models (preferences, utility, maximization) |
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reading: | Chapter 1 of Lecture Notes, "Rational Choice Models." |
group A assignment: | |
none | |
group B assignment: | |
none |
topic: | Probability, Expectation, and Rational Choice Under Uncertainty |
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reading: | Chapter 2 of Lecture Notes, "Models of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty." |
group A assignment: | |
Problem Set 1 | |
group B assignment: | |
Problem Set 1 |
topic: | An Early Analysis of Political Accountability |
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reading: | Chapters 3 and 4 of An Economoic Theory of Democracy by Anthony Downs |
group A assignment: | |
Problem Set 2 | |
group B assignment: | |
Problem Set 2 |
topic: | Game Theory Basics -- Mostly Sequential Move Games; A bit of Dynamic Programming |
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reading: | Chapter 3 of Lecture Notes, "Game Theory" |
group A assignment: | |
paper on Downs | |
group B assignment: | |
paper on Downs |
topic: | Accountability with "Hidden Actions" |
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reading: | John Ferejohn (1986) "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control." |
group A assignment: | |
Problem Set 3 | |
group B assignment: | |
Problem Set 3 |
topic: | Screening vs. Sanctioning |
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reading: | James D. Fearon (1999) "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types vs. Sanctioning Poor Performance." In Przeworski, Stokes and Manin Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge University Press. |
group A assignment: | |
paper on Ferejohn | |
group B assignment: | |
none |
topic: | An Empirical Investigation of Accountability |
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reading: | Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady and John F. Cogan (2002) "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Member's Voting." American Political Science Review. 96(1): 127 -- 140. |
group A assignment: | |
none | |
group B assignment: | |
paper on Fearon |
topic: | Pandering |
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reading: | Sanford C. Gordon and Gregory A. Huber (2004) "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?" American Journal of Political Science. 48(2): 247 -- 263. |
group A assignment: | |
paper on Canes-Wrone et al. | |
group B assignment: | |
none |
topic: | Intro to Public Goods and Models of Taxation |
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reading: | none |
group A assignment: | |
none | |
group B assignment: | |
paper on Gordon and Huber |
topic: | Electoral Competition and Public Good Provision |
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reading: | Chapter 3 of Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini Political Economics |
group A assignment: | |
Problem Set 4 | |
group B assignment: | |
Problem Set 4 |
November 21
NO CLASS!!!
topic: | Redistribution |
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reading: | Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen Weibull "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition." 52(3): 273--297. |
group A assignment: | |
paper on Persson and Tabellini Chapter 3 | |
group B assignment: | |
paper on Persson and Tabellini Chapter 3 |
topic: | Redistribution and Inefficiency |
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reading: | Avinash Dixit and John Londregan (1995) "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency." American Political Science Review 89(4): 856--866. |
group A assignment: | |
Paper on Linbeck and Weibull | |
group B assignment: | |
none |
topic: | wrap up |
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reading: | none |
group A assignment: | |
none | |
group B assignment: | |
paper on Dixit and Londregan |