

Assignments are to be turned in by class time on the day they are due. They should be in hardcopy unless unforeseen circumstances prevent printing them in or handing them in a timely manner. For every 24 hours that pass thereafter, 5% of credit is lost, to a maximum of 40% lost.

Exams are to be sat at the date and time specified, unless prior approval has been given or a doctor's excuse is submitted at the next attended class meeting. Exams should be sat within 1 week of the general administration of the exam.

Grades are assigned to both individual pieces of work and cumulatively. The grade scale I use for both is below (note that "g" refers to the numerical grade you receive). I do not usually curve grades, but reserve the right to do so if I deem it necessary. All material is graded on its own terms, rather than through comparison with other students' work. For the cumulative grades, I do not round: what you get is what you get.

100>g≥93: A	90>g≥88: B+	80>g≥78: C+	70>g≥68: D+	60>g: E
	88>g≥83: B	78>g≥73: C	68>g≥63: D	
93>g≥90: A-	83>g≥80: B	73>g≥70: C-	63>g≥60: D	

Cheating and plagiarism are, of course, unacceptable in academic work, and when suspected will be pursued through the appropriate university channels. Proper citations and standards of integrity are not optional. If you have questions about what this means, please ask the instructor.

In the event that there is a need for there to be any changes to the syllabus, an e-mail will be sent to all students' e-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar), and will be mentioned in class at two class meetings. Changes become effective immediately after their second mention in class, or the sending of the e-mail, whichever comes last.

In the event that the instructor needs to cancel class, an e-mail will be sent to all students' e-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar) prior to class time.

Schedule of Classes:

J. Cole and D. Kandiyote, Nationalism and the Colonial Identity in the Middle East and Central Asia, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34:2
 Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, University of California Press, Chapter 8, "The Problem of Economic Development,"
 G. Kepel, *On the Trail of Political Islam*, selection

O. Roy, *Globalized Islam*, Selection
 SHAQ, pp. 9-109

D. Foyle, Leading the Public to War? *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 16:3
Simon Serfaty, *Architects of Delusion*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, pp. 1-45
W. Haumman and T. Peterson, German Public Opinion and the Iraq Conflict, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 16:3

Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 208-496

Section Recommendations:

Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*

Mark Joslyn, "Determinates of Recall Error about Gulf War Preferences," *American Journal of Political Science*, 47:3

Alex Thompson, *Channels of Power*, Cornell UP, 2009

R. Kagan, Power and Weakness, *Policy Review* 2002

R. Gottemoeller, The Evolution of Sanctions, *Survival*, 94:4

M. Alexander and J. Kieger, Limiting Arms, Enforcing Limits: International Inspections and the Challenges of Compellance in Germany Post-1919 and Iraq post-1991, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29:2

P. Kowert and M. Hermann, Who Takes Risks? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41:5

M. Hermann and T. Preston, Presidents, Advisors, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements, *Political Psychology*, 15:1

V. Shannon and J. Keller, Leadership Style and Norm Violation, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 3:1

Leonie Huddle, Stanley Feld3 (t) 0.0.5 (ig) 0.2 (n) -0.2 (P0.2 (L) 0.34 49i.24 0 0 0.24 254.5126 439..5 (ig) (c) 0.5

Section Recommendations:

P. Bremer, J. Dobbins, and D. Gompert, Early Days in Iraq: Decisions of the CPA, *Survival*, 50:4
Battle of Algiers

W. Gray, *Embedded*. USNI Press, 2009

Mao, *On Guerilla Warfare*

Rieko Kage, "Making Reconstruction Work: Civil Society and Information after War's End,"
Comparative Political Studies, 43:2.

C. Malkasian, Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Falluja, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29:3

T. Dodge, The Causes of US Failure in Iraq, *Survival*, 49:1

Tripp, 277-316

E. Herring and G. Rangwala, *Iraq in Fragments*, 2006

T. Dodge, The Causes of US Failure in Iraq, *Survival*, 49:1

C. Malkasian, Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Falluja, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29:3

Thomas Ricks, *The Gamble*

TBA

Stephen Biddle, Michael O'Hanlon, Kenneth Pollack, "How to Leave a Stable Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*,
Sept-Oct 2008

Section Recommendations:

US Army Field Manual FM-23, *Counter-Insurgency*

P. Rottman, D. Tohn, J. Wharton, Learning Under Fire, *Survival*, 51:4

G. Gentile, Learning, Adapting, and the Perils of the New Counterinsurgency, *Survival*, 51:6

M. Fitzsimmons, Hard Hearts, and Open Minds? Governance, Identity, and the Intellectual
Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 31:3

L. Krause, Playing For Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes. *Parameters*, Aut 2009

S. Telhami, America In Arab Eyes, *Survival*, 49:1

Bruce Moon, "Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq," *International Security*, 33:4
(2009)

Jones, *GoE*, 134-326

C. Fair and S. Jones, Pakistan's War Within, *Survival*, 51:6

Jacob Shapiro and Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,"
International Security, 34:3, Winter 2009/2010

