
**Political Science 580. Political Economy of Development
Economics, Political Science 582. Political Economy II**

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Harkness 327

Office Hours: W 2–3:30

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Course Info:

Spring 2009

MW 9:40–10:55

Harkness 112

How do political institutions affect economic outcomes? How do economic conditions determine political institutions? This course reviews recent advances in the emerging field of the political economy of institutions and development, with a focus on formal modeling and quantitative studies. We start with an introduction to the importance of institutions in affecting economic

Course Outline

1. An Introduction to Institutions (two lectures)

Wednesday January 14

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2001. 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation' *American Economic Review*. 91(5): 1369-1401.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2002. 'Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the World Income Distribution.' *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 117(4): 1231-1294.
- *Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2005. 'Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth' in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. eds.

- *Barro, Robert J. 1996. 'Democracy and Growth' *Journal of Economic Growth*. 1(1): 1-27. (E)
- Demsetz, Harold. 1967. 'Toward a Theory of Property Rights.' *American Economic Review*

- *Roberts, Kevin W. S. 1977. 'Voting Over Income Tax Schedules.' *Journal of Public Economics*. 8(3): 329-340. (E)

2.2 Lobbying, Vote-Buying (three lectures)

Wednesday January 28

- Becker, Gary S. 1983. 'A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.' *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 98(3): 371-400.
- *Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. 'Protection for Sale.' *American Economic Review*. 84(4): 833-850. (E)
- Lohmann, Suzanne. 1995. 'Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying.' *Public Choice* 85(3-4): 267-284.
- *Peltzman, Sam. 1976. 'Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.' *Journal of Law and Economics*. 19(2): 211-240. (E)
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2002. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 58-62, 171-175, 180-185.

Monday February 2

- *Dal Bo, Ernesto. 2007. 'Bribing Voters' *American Journal of Political Science*. 51(4): 789-803. (E)
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3. Democratization (nine lectures)

3.1 Modernization Theory (one lecture)

Wednesday February 11

Monday March 30

- Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier. 2004. 'Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule.' Alfred Marshall Lecture, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, April-May 2(2-3): 162-192.
- *Debs, Alexandre. 2007. 'Divide-and-Rule and the Media.' University of Rochester mimeo. (E)

- Robinson, James A. and Ragnar Torvik. 2005. 'White Elephants.' *Journal of Public Economics* 89(2-3): 197-210.

4.3 Dictatorship and War (two lectures)

Monday April 13

- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986.' *American Political Science Review*. 87(3): 624-638.
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Topic Presentations (two lectures)

Monday April 27

Wednesday April 29

FINAL EXAM

Wednesday May 6 (in class). 9am to 12noon.

Schedule of Assignments

Problem Sets

Problem set 1: Handed out on January 21. Due February 4.

Problem set 2: Handed out on February 4. Due February 18.

Problem set 3: Handed out on February 18. Due March 4.

Problem set 4: Handed out on March 18. Due April 1.

Problem set 5: Handed out on April 1. Due April 22.

Topic Reviews

Topic Review 1: List of 3 papers due February 25. Review due March 18.

Topic Review 2: List of 3 papers due March 30. Review due April 13.

Topic Presentation and Final Exam (see above).