Spring 2013 – W 9:00-12:00	
Avada u A anomia	
First the same of	:
Email: aachary3@z.rochester.edu	
Office Hours: W14:00-15:15 or by appointment	
Description	
What are the consequences of different political institutions on various outcomes?	
What are the causes and motivations to timese political movements and what is the	
mechanism by which they are organized? What are the political eauses of	
Why are redistribution and the size of government greater in some countries than others?	
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mere unt inner inecembre m connuciative million. The confice and mu univer these	
questions.	
The first formula of decision of the first formula of decision of the first of the first decision of the first formula of the first for	
new tepics emerging as we go along. I will assign problem sets almost every week. Each	-,
atudant will do two in alore presentations. Dates will be not for these presentations ofter	
Spring Drook For one of the presentations was must present an assigned namer (i.e. one	
to notinear concerns on the cullchild loss the next half of the course.) How the office proceedation view have the	
C. M. was some from sutaids the willows but along consult me for annexal or	
cunnections. Levnante high quality presentations. There will be a final avers on May 1	
the mantem sets will equot for 40% at your grade the bresentations for 31/26 and the interest and inc	
final exam for the remaining 30%. You can work with each other on the problem sets, but	
you must write your own solutions to receive credit.	
Do alam	
Books	
Survey of the second of the state of the state of the second second second second second second second second	
following books are useful references.	
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rudenberg and Tirole. Game Incory.	
Kreps. Notes on the Theory of Choice.	
Accomogic, would be a constant	

We will try to cover the following papers and topics in detail before Spring Break.

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We will try to cover the following papers and topics in detail before Spring Break.

may not get to all of them, skipping some if we fall behind schedule. You do not have to read these papers before class since I will be teaching them from handouts. (In fact, it is not a monotonic paper on for before) March 20, I will provide a list of papers that we will cover after Spring Break.

January 16

Meltzer, A and S. Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of

Political Competition," Public Choice.

in India: Voter Preferences and Policy Outcomes in Uttar Pradesh" working paper.

Roemer, J. "The Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation," *Econometrica*.

January 23

Acharya, A. "Equilibrium False Consciousness" working paper.

Persson T and G Tabellini Political Economics, Chapter 8: "Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition."

Pozsesr. T-ord G. Tabellini Political Economics, Chapter 9: "Institutions and Accountability."

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, Political Economics, Chapter 10: "Political Regimes."

Diermeier and Merlo. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracy" Journal of

January 30

Acemoglu, D. Modern Economic Growth, Appendix C: "Dynamic Games."

Acemoglu, D. "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States," *Journal of Monetary Economics*.

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Battaglini, M. "A Dynamic Theory of Electoral Competition," working paper. February 6 Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Chapter 5: "Nondemocratic Politics." Acamaalu D and J Rahinson Feanamic Origins of Dietatorshin and Damagram Chapter 6: "Democratization." Acomogly, D. and I. Dobinson. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Domocracy. Chapter 7: "Coups and Consolidation" Acharya, A. "Coordination and Development in Dictatorships" working paper. February 13 manus example. Timbis Pendok Nindigni. "Andogan examinati intima". Feomonia Lournal r commencemente DivityAvand I. Landragan "The Potenninents of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics" Journal of Politics. Borobou, B., "Idoology". Journal of the European Economic Association February 20 Than Trinques, U. The Tomes of I car, Connot of Tomes in Divided Doctores Review of Economic Studies. unayo, m. A mouti of botiai luchary whit air Apphitauon to i onlicar Loomoniy. Nadon, Class and Redistribution," American Political Science Review. Sambanis N. and M. Shavo. "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict." American Political Science Review. February 27 DIXIT A, and I Londregan. "Political Power and the Credibility of Government Deof." Journal of Economic Theory

Phelan, C. "Public Trust and Government Betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory.

Political Economy.

Divit A. G. Groseman and F. Gul, "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of

March 6

Battaglini, M. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt" *American Economic Review*.

rveneve vermus. Perskije Tojad Tabachije Chlanco Canceltio Conflict. Aconomica was "Formatica

Acharya, A. "Insecure Property Rights," working paper.